Action Plan
All completed actions go through an assurance process to ensure the expected improvement outcomes have been achieved. The action plans will be updated and republished every other month.
Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI)
The service still doesn’t have an effective system to make sure it gathers and records relevant and up-to-date risk information to help protect firefighters, the public and property during an emergency. We found examples of risk information available not being effective, accurate or up to date. Concerningly, most operational staff haven’t been given the support they need to collect risk information, and there is limited strategic oversight in place to improve the risk information process. The service still doesn’t use the data it collects well. There are no prevention, protection or response strategies in place to implement the Service Plan 2023–2026. We are concerned about the way the service identifies, gathers and maintains risk information. Staff don’t routinely use the risk information available to them. The corporate risk register needs to be refined.
By 19 September 2023, the service should provide an action plan to demonstrate how it will meet our recommendations, and it should have an effective risk information process in place. The service should make sure:
- it has identified all those premises that require a site-specific risk visit;
- staff are trained in how to carry out a site-specific risk visit and identify site-specific risk information (SSRI);
- it has effective quality assurance and strategic oversight arrangements in place;
- temporary risks, including individual vulnerabilities that are added onto the risk information system, are managed appropriately;
- risk information is uploaded in a timely manner; and
- fire control has access to relevant and up-to-date risk information, including evacuation strategies, in high-rise residential buildings.
Mobilising IT
The service’s mobilisation system, which records information and dispatches resources to emergency incidents, is not reliable and crashes during emergency 999 calls. This unnecessarily delays the mobilisation of resources, which results in the public receiving a slower response to emergencies.
We are concerned about the longstanding issues with the mobilisation system. During emergency 999 calls, the mobilisation system, which records information and dispatches resources to emergency incidents, isn’t reliable and crashes. This causes unnecessary delay in the mobilisation of resources and results in the public receiving a slower response to emergencies. For example, we were concerned to hear about a particular ambulance service request for an emergency response to a serious road traffic collision. While the fire control operator was recording the information to dispatch resources, the system crashed. This resulted in the fire control operator having to use a different console and restart the whole process as other operators were busy taking other calls.
These concerns have placed unnecessary stress on fire control staff. We were told that multiple health and safety ‘near miss’ forms were completed to report this issue as it has adversely affected staff welfare, but these have been overlooked or ignored. Fire control staff didn’t know who was dealing with the issue, and limited updates have been provided.
We were informed that this issue was caused by an update to the mobilisation system. At the time of our inspection, the service told us that the mobilisation system had crashed or frozen on 20 occasions in the past 12 months. But members of staff told us this has happened many more times and some staff have stopped reporting the problem.
In 2021/22, the service received 20,979 emergency calls. Although the system has crashed on comparatively few occasions, the actual number of times this has happened is believed to be much higher than reported. In the circumstances, even one delay is too many because it could put the public at risk. The service doesn’t record how long the system is down on each occasion, so it can’t assure itself that the issue hasn’t had a detrimental effect on the response the public receives. Worryingly, at the time we discovered these problems, they hadn’t been appropriately escalated and prioritised and weren’t on the service’s corporate risk register. The service has limited plans in place to address them.
By 19 September 2023, the service should develop an action plan to make sure:
- the mobilisation system is effective and that it doesn’t result in the public receiving a slower response to emergencies;
- it has strategic oversight arrangements in place and that any faults are recorded regularly and escalated to senior leaders where necessary; and
- fire control staff are provided with regular updates and welfare support is put
in place.
Culture
The service has shown an intent to improve its culture, with some staff reporting improvements across the service. However, more needs to be done. We found evidence of behaviours that weren’t in line with service values. We were told about cultures among some teams where staff demonstrate unacceptable behaviours, such as using sexist or inappropriate language and disguising this as banter. And worryingly, some staff don’t have the confidence to report these issues.
We were told that there is a disconnect at different levels of the service, such as between middle and senior management, and information isn’t always filtered down to the whole workforce. We are concerned that some behaviours we were told about don’t meet the standards expected. The culture of the organisation doesn’t always align with its values. And there isn’t a strong culture of challenge. The service has a clearly defined set of values, but it should improve awareness of them at all levels.
We were told about several examples of poor behaviour that staff have experienced, such as:
- sexist or homophobic language and inappropriate language being disguised as banter;
- poor cultures among some operational teams, where staff have made it clear that they won’t work in these areas;
- corporate staff being undermined by operational staff and some on-call staff not feeling valued; and
- operational staff not attending mandatory HR-related training despite being on duty.
Worryingly, we found that some staff didn’t have the confidence to challenge poor behaviour or report this to their line managers. Most staff we spoke with during our inspection were committed. But some felt frustrated with the middle management level and above. We were told that there is a disconnect at different levels of the service, such as between middle and senior leaders. Some staff told us that information isn’t always filtered down effectively from senior leaders and that some leaders aren’t approachable.
We spoke with some staff who were frustrated with the number of changes at middle management level. At one fire station, there had been at least four different station managers in the previous 12 months. This doesn’t help to build an effective working relationship between staff and line managers.
The chief fire officer wrote to all females across the service after media reports of poor culture in the service. Although this was a positive step, some females we spoke with felt that these were “just words” and there was a lack of follow-up or action. They feel that their line managers don’t know what to do when approached with an issue or what support they should provide. Disappointingly, we heard from one female member of staff whose line manager told her not to approach them if they had any problems. We also heard from other staff who have raised workforce concerns but haven’t been provided with appropriate support.
At the time of our inspection, the service introduced its ‘being the best that you can be’ framework, which sets out the expectations for leaders. The service has also introduced a zero-tolerance statement and a dignity and respect toolkit. However, managers and wider staff aren’t trained and supported to identify and challenge inappropriate behaviour. Senior leaders recognise there is a lot more to do in terms of improving the organisational culture.
Prevention
Prevention activity isn’t a sufficiently high priority for the service, and there is no prevention strategy, which should drive its day-to-day activities. The service doesn’t adequately prioritise home fire safety visits (HFSVs) on the basis of risk. We found that HFSVs were arranged based on staff’s availability as opposed to risk. We found several HFSVs that were outstanding for a significant period of time due to resourcing issues.
Within 28 days, the service should develop an action plan to:
- develop and implement a prevention strategy that prioritises the people most at risk of fire and makes sure that work to reduce risk is proportionate;
- make sure there are strategic oversight arrangements in place and detailed key performance indicators for HFSVs;
- address the HFSVs backlog in a way that is both timely and prioritised on the basis of risk;
- make sure it quality assures its prevention activity so staff carry out HFSVs to an appropriate standard;
- make sure staff carry out HFSVs and wider prevention activities competently; and
- make sure the prevention department has enough resources to implement all its prevention activity and review whether wholetime firefighters can offer more capacity to prevention.